The following offers a close reading of Smith's discourse with attention to the Plotinian sources of his arguments. In the process, a window opens onto an early modern constructive appropriation of Plotinus and a bridge is illuminated from antiquity to modernity.
Smith's Premises
Smith opens his discourse on the immortality of the soul with three premises, the acceptance of which is required to fully appreciate the arguments that follow.
First, Smith suggests with Cicero that the consensus among philosophers means the immortality of the soul does "not absolutely need any Demonstration" at all. 12 Since the notion is one naturally arrived at by even "the most vulgar sort of men" and since "all Nations have consented in this belief"
there should be no need to answer for this article of Christian faith. 13 Far from simply an appeal to popularity however Smith avers that since this idea is held by all "with a kind of repugnancy to Sense, which shows all things to be mortal" it is certainly the "common dictate of Nature or Reason acting alike in all men" that "forcibly urge [s] them to believe their own Immortality." 14 Nevertheless, one should not need to argue this and yet Smith, of course, knows that in his day one must; a clear indication of how urgent the moment was for him.
Second, in keeping with the Platonic tradition, Smith suggests that one may only come "to a right conceiving [of] 
the force of any such Arguments as may prove the Souls Immortality" if we have "an
antecedent Converse with our own Souls." 15 That is, to see that the soul is immortal one must have an immediate familiarity with one's own soul. As Plotinus put it, "let the man who has abstracted consider himself; he will then know for sure that he is immortal." 16 12 Smith, "Immortality," 63, citing Cicero's Tusculanae Disputationes, I.12-14. 13 Smith, "Immortality," 63. 14 Ibid., 64. 15 Ibid., Smith's third premise asserts with Plotinus "That no Substantial and Indivisible thing ever perisheth." 17 In a rare direct reference to Plato, Smith appeals to the "sober Thesis" found in the Timaeus (41a-b) that substances persist out of the "Benignity and Liberality of the Creator" and he draws the inference that "Plato held that the whole world, however it might meet with many Periodical mutations should remain Eternally." 18 This he thinks "Christian Divinity doth no where deny." 19 But, as is so often the case he backs this point not with scripture or the Fathers of the Church but with Plotinus who "frames this general Axiom, οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἀπολεῖται, that no Substance shall ever perish."
20
While Smith uses this principle to defend Platonic anti-materialism he is quick to note that even his opponents accept it as a basic premise. For even the learned Epicureans of old and his own day grant that nothing is made from nothing and nothing reverts to nothing. 21 Indeed, they argue that atoms are indestructible precisely because they are simple and without parts. 22 In much the same way Smith will argue that the soul is indestructible and therefore immortal. This is what Mijuskovic has identified as the first significant English use of the "simplicity argument." 23 In this, he is clearly following the example of Plotinus. "Everything that can be broken up has acquired its being through composition of parts . . . . But soul is a simple nature, a simplex, that exists in actuality through being alive. Because of this, it cannot be destroyed.
24
But Smith will not be content to argue for the "immortality" had by mere atoms. Wilson ignores this when she criticizes Smith for his supposed favoring of the arguments offered by Descartes. The 17 Smith, "Immortality," 66. Smith cites IV.7.14.14 "nothing of real being perishes" (67) . 18 Smith, "Immortality, [66] [67] citing Plato's Timaeus, . 19 Smith, "Immortality, " 67. 20 Ibid., citing IV.7.14.20. Smith's text, as is often the case, is not exact here but this is clearly his intended passage. It is the idea that matters for Smith, not the text. 21 Smith, "Immortality, " 66. Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, . 22 Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 54. 23 Mijuskovic, Achilles, 23, and 26 . See also Jean-Pierre Schachter, "Locke and the Achilles Argument," in The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology, ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Robert J. Stainton (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008) , 123-125. 24 weakness of the indestructibility argument on its own is why Smith offers so many additional considerations. 25 To it, he will add epistemic reflections to distinguish the immortal soul from merely infinitely persistent matter. In the process, Smith marks a step in the modern development of what Kant would eventually call the "Achilles" argument.
26
Drawing on both Plotinus and Descartes, Smith closes his discussion of the third premise by distinguishing substances of two basic sorts: body and spirit (including soul or mind). Body Smith says is divisible, material, and extended in three dimensions while spirit, soul, or mind is incorporeal, immaterial, has no dimensions, and thus no parts.
27
Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul Smith's formal arguments for the immortality of the soul are four in number; two against the Epicureans directly and two positive Platonic arguments. Each draws from similar arguments offered by Plotinus in second treatise (IV.7), either explicitly or implicitly. In fact, the sequence of Smith's discourse roughly follows that of Plotinus' throughout. Moreover, Smith's arguments follow the levels of knowledge from Plato's Divided Line and elaborated variously in the Platonic tradition thereafter.
28
Smith's "Immortality" and the next discourse on the nature and existence of God represent, therefore, a staged ascent from the sensible and material realm, through the rational soul, to the Divine. Sensatum, seeing except we first know what it is to know, we could not judge or determine aright upon the approach of any of these Idola to our Senses. 45 Smith adds this observation because he realizes, with Plotinus, that sense perception does involve the body. But, again with Plotinus, Smith argues that we perceive and know through and with our physical senses not by them.
46
Without a higher or anterior immaterial principle, we also could not know the difference between the apparent and the actual size of the sun because this rests on non-sensory mathematical reasoning (dianoia). Smith refers here to Proclus and Aristotle to the effect that Epicurus was wrong about distant objects being as they appear not because of a defect in our senses but a mistake in our reasoning. 47 Moreover, Smith sides with Plotinus when he says that our minds must remove themselves from the concerns of the body to "nakedly discern truth." 48 In addition, he agrees with Plotinus that sense perception requires a principle of higher unity beyond the physical. This "common sense" as Aristotle calls it "collects and unites all the Perceptions of our Several Senses." 49 Smith is arguing that, in the words of Plotinus, "if one perception comes through the eyes and another through our hearing, there still must be something single to which both perceptions come . . . a sort of hub with our perceptions reaching it from all sides like radii converging from the circumference of a circle." 50 As
Mijuskovic puts it, "only an immaterial simple can serve as a 'transcendental' condition for the unity of And if any can conceive all this to be nothing but a meer fighting of the male-contented pieces of Matter one against another, each striving for superiority and preeminence; I should not think it worth the while to teach such an one any higher learning, as looking upon him to be indued with no higher a Soul then that which moves in Beasts or Plants.
75
The Reasoning Argument Smith's third argument considers the soul at yet "a further degree of Abstraction . . . in these and concepts (equality, symmetry, divisibility, etc.) do not depend upon the corporeal world. In fact, these do not even perfectly relate to extended objects. Mathematical and geometrical concepts are contained, Smith says, within the rational soul and cannot be properly speaking "buried in Matter."
78
Here he follows the spirit, if not the letter, of Plotinus: "Geometry and arithmetic are, we shall maintain, of a twofold character: in their earthly types they rank with sensible Quality, but in so far as they are functions of pure Soul, they necessarily belong to that other world in close proximity to the intellectual."
79
To illustrate his point, already familiar to any "Geometrican," Smith points out how easily our rational souls perform geometrical operations despite the physical impossibility of duplicating them in 74 Smith, "Immortality," 92. reasons "from these notions of Quantity, which come not by any possible Sense or Experience which we can make of bodily Being, and therefore concludes they must needs be immediately ingraven upon an Immaterial Soul." 85 Our immaterial rational souls judge the material world by the eternal perfection of arithmetic and Euclidian geometry, and as that which measures is distinct from that which is measured, our soul is necessarily distinct from the material body. That which is immaterial is without parts and therefore immortal as all simple substances must be. As if to confirm his Plotinian bona fides, Smith concludes his third argument with the observation that, "our Bodies should rather be in our Souls, then Plotinus, of course develops this theme in many passages but tellingly he addresses it prominently in his treatise on the immortality of the soul. 89 Being capable of the intuition of immaterial intelligibles the rational soul, the higher soul that remains united with intellect, cannot be material. 90 This is a version of the "Affinity Argument" for the immortal soul offered in the Phaedo.
91
In addition to these Plotinian considerations, Smith also draws upon the Cartesian intuition of the self as a thinking thing, more easily conceived than even our notion of our own body. 92 "For whensoever we take notice of those Immediate motions of our own Minds whereby they make themselves known to us, we find no such thing in them as Extension or Divisibility." 93 But this Cartesian argument does not really do much work for Smith and he returns immediately to his true guide, 87 Specifically, Smith recalls the treatment thereof given by Proclus, In Timaeus, . 88 Smith, "Immortality," 97. Cf. IV.7.8.7-26. Smith's discourse then is both a series of arguments and a staged ascent to true intellection in preparation for contemplation of God in the next discourse. As is so often the case with Plotinus too, Smith is rhetorically and dialectically bearing his reader (originally hearer) "up" from the world of sense, through themselves as immortal souls, toward God as Summum Bonum, Alpha and Omega.
89 IV.7.8.1-7; IV.7.9.26-27; etc. 90 IV.7.13.1-4 (cf. IV.8.8); IV.7.10.1-6. 91 Plato, Phaedo, 78b4-84b4. 92 Smith, "Immortality," 98. Descartes, Meditations, Second Meditation (ATVII: 23-34; CSM II: 16-23). 93 Smith, "Immortality," 98. Any soul that has summitted "this bright Olympus" will have no doubt about its own immortality. 99 For the soul "will then feel it self grasping fast and safely its own Immortality, and view it self in the Horizon of Eternity." 100 This is the sort of "sober ecstasies" Smith identifies with Plotinus' account of being separated from his body. 101 Unlike Patrides and many others Smith understood that 94 Plotinus too argues that body is characterized by "magnitude" (μέγεθος) in the sense of extension and resistance. IV.7.1.17-18. See also Emilsson, Plotinus, 102. 95 Smith, "Immortality," 99. Smith is employing the "one over many" argument. See for example Phaedo, 100c-d. 96 Smith, "Immortality," 99, citing IV.8.1. 97 Smith, "Immortality," 99. 98 Ibid., citing Proclus, In Timaeus, 99 Smith, "Immortality," 99. 100 Ibid., 100. 101 IV.8.1, as given in Smith, "Immortality," 100.
the "flight of the Soul alone to God alone" is not about leaving the world for some other region but a call to become who we really are.
102
The fourth argument closes by relating "that which breeds a true sense of" the immortal soul as a kind of self-awareness. 136 But, for him, this self is not necessarily immaterial or simple. 137 However,
Smith's anti-materialist argument, which Locke knew well, had inferred an immaterial identity from our experience of memory and anticipation. 138 Thus, Locke accepts Smith's conclusion that the self "necessarily involves a unification of memory and anticipation," even as he denies the necessary immateriality of this self. 139 As is so often the case, Smith, and Locke too in a limited way, is following the lead of Plotinus here: "And if, as is the case with the rest of our bodily mass, something will always be ebbing away, something always being added, and none of it remaining the same, then how can we account for our memories?"
140
Even more intriguingly while Locke takes up a position that is in "conscious opposition to the position of Smith concerning the immortality of the soul" he found Smith's Plotinian arguments "more than plausible when applied to God." 141 Since no body is simple, a material God would be a collection of smaller bodies. However, such a collection yields not a single Deity but many "eternal finite cogitative
Beings, independent one of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts." 142 This cannot account for the conscious unity Locke thinks appropriate for God. 143 So he embraces Smith's line of thought, derived ultimately from Plotinus, that if the mind "is a body there will be no perceiving, thinking, understanding, virtue-or any noble activity." 144 But, unlike Smith, Locke denies the force of the argument where the human soul is concerned. 145 Nevertheless, behind these reflections lies the pioneering work of Smith.
Conclusion
Far from a sign of mere historical curiosity Smith's turn to ancient sources was motivated by contemporary concerns. With his Cambridge colleagues, he clearly saw the incoherence of materialism and the threat it posed to traditional Christian belief. In the philosophy of Plotinus as an authoritative interpreter of the Platonic tradition, Smith found the resources to defend the immortality of the soul. In the process, he passed on a living tradition of Christian Platonism that inspired future generations including the thoroughly modern philosophy of Locke. In echoing Smith, a vestige of Plotinus found its way into the modern world.
